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Abstract
This paper complements the traditional theory of teams (Fama (1980),
Holmstrom (1982a,b)) by introducing endogenous team formation by agents
who are concerned with their reputations and are informed about the
types of their potential teammates. Such a situation leads to a tradeo
between joining a high-productivity type but a low-reputation partner.
It is examined whether there are gains from trade, both, for the case of
non-transferable and transferable utility, and what can be learned from
reputation deals. Furthermore, a signaling model of teaming is developed
that captures in a consistent way the process of information acquisition by
the agents' strategic opponent, the market.
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Introduction
In some real-life situations, formation of a team is not imposed, rather a vol-
untary act. One may think, for example, of researchers who join each other
in writing papers, or legal counsellors who found law rms in order to work
together. There is a variety of well-known reasons why we can observe the
formation of teams, although individual operation of the potential teammates
is possible. These reasons can basically be resumed under the two notions of
economies of scale and synergy eects: as an example for the rst, sharing
equipment or auxiliary sta may save on costs. As an example for the second,
a traditional researcher in the area of international economics (who has ran out
of ideas) might join a game theorist (who has run out of theories) in order to
write a paper in which game theory is applied to international economics.
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In the following I will argue from the perspective of information economics
that there are additional reasons for team-formation that go beyond the con-
ventional scale and synergy eects. Broadly speaking, teams are sometimes as-
sociated with non-observability to outsiders of the individual conributions (that
even in the case of solo performance might be jammed by some stochastic vari-
able), and these contributions may depend on individual characteristics. The
following questions then arise: a) who is interested in having his characteristics
concealed (revealed), b) who could be helpful in just achieving this by agreeing
to team up, and c) are there gains from trade by doing so?
Whereas the answer to the rst question is quite trivial, it is the second and
third one that attracts the attention. If markets pay compensation according to
perceived productivity, then agents are interested in achieving high reputation.
Furthermore, in many situations, although reputation of an agent is common
knowledge, his characteristics are private information to him  or to other
agents who potentially could join him in a team. Two lawyers, for example,
might know each other from law school where they had done joint course work.
Hence, each one probably is well informed about the skills of the other, the
market, however, after observing the initial stages of their careers, holds only
imperfect information about these abilities. When then reasoning about the
usefulness of forming a team with another agent, two eects need to be traded
o against each other: on the one hand, having a partner with high ability
increases the probability of good results  and low-ability types will be able to
free-ride on this. On the other hand, choosing a partner with higher reputation
than one's own will persuade a Bayesian updater to attribute responsibility for
good results more to the other, while bad results are more blamed on oneself.
It is this tradeo that motivates the analysis conducted in the present work.
Formally, I will examine the question under which conditions there are gains
from trade by teaming up for two agents who know each others' characteristics,
both for the case of transferable and non-transferable utility. Doing so might
help us to learn a lesson from the observation that a team is formed or not.
Moreover, if the market itself  as strategic opponent of the two agents 
1
Or the two might take advantage of the CV synergy eect: one publication is still con-
sidered by some university departments indiscriminately as a publication for each of the co-
authors.
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wants to draw some inference, then one has to take into account of the po-
tential manipulability of the signal represented by the decision of both to go
together or to refrain from doing so. Introducing teaming-costs that depend on
the combination of types allows us to analyze this issue in a signaling frame-
work. Intuitively, one could imagine that those combinations that join higher
productive abilities also do easier in organizing team work. Hence, we might
expect that information is (partly) revealed by the teaming option.
The present work is a complement to the traditional theory of teams for the
case that team-formation is an endogenous decision by the potential teammates
and their types is common private information to them. It is related to the
seminal research by Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1982b) on the possibility that
the market's perception of productivity may solve the moral hazard problem
in a single-agent framework via reputation concerns, and to Jeon (1996), who
looks at exactly the same issue, with the modication, however, that (a team
of) two agents exert unobservable eort, and therefore, are able to free-ride on
each other's contribution for the sake of own reputation. In fact, incentives via
reputation concerns could be weakened due to the potential of the teaming-
mechanism for revealing types before actual team-production takes place.
The topic discussed in the present paper is also related to the work by
Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) on partnerships, which are endogenously formed
teams with equal sharing of group revenue. In their setting, incentives to form
teams arise because scale eects from the number of teammates are in place.
Concerning the composition of these teams, equal revenue sharing implies that
a partition of the set of all individuals takes place, where those with similar
abilities are grouped together in the same partnership.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces a model of individual
and joint production, the latter of which in two varieties, and then discusses
the Bayesian procedure used to update reputations after output is observed.
Sections II and III analyze the gains from trade for the dierent combinations
of types, given that this updating procedure is applied. In Section IV we discuss
the information revealed to an outside observer by the decision of the agents
to team up or to refrain from doing so. Section V looks at a simple signaling
framework that fully internalizes the strategic incentives for teaming, allowing
for a consistent modeling of information revelation to the market as strategic
opponent of the agents.
I. The Framework
The output of agent i is
q
i
= 
i
+ 
i
; (1)
where 
i
is the deterministic component that, at the same time, represents
i's type, and 
i
is a stochastic factor that inuences i's work. As a matter
of analytical tractability, we assume that both components are from the set
f0; 1g. The probability of experiencing a favourable result from nature's choice is
prob(
i
= 1) = r. We assume that the stochastic components are independently
2
distributed over all agents. Agent i is aware of his own type, but the market is
not: all potential principals only know that agents are drawn from an a-priori-
distribution, with prob(
i
= 1) = p, and that these draws are independent.
Furthermore, also the disturbances are not observable to the market.
After the course of time, observations are made by the market relating to
the performance of agent i, whether he has worked on his own or joined a team.
We denote by p
i
t+1
the reputation of i for being the good type, stemming from
Bayesian updating of p
i
t
after observing outputs in t. Initially, at the beginning
of their career in t = 0, all agents start with p
i
0
= p, with time, however, their
reputations may take dierent paths. There are two possible regimes that imply
dierences in what is observable to the principals.
Staying Alone
The market observes agent i's output in t, realized according to (1), and, given
his reputation p
i
t
, calculates a Bayesian update p
i
t+1
:= p
i
t+1
(q
i
jp
i
t
). Given the
choice of f0; 1g as domain for 
i
and 
i
, it is straightforward that
p
i
t+1
(q
i
jp
i
t
) =
8
>
<
>
>
:
0 for q
i
= 0
p
i
t
(1 r)
p
i
t
(1 r)+(1 p
i
t
)r
for q
i
= 1
1 for q
i
= 2,
(2)
as q
i
2 f0; 1; 2g are the only possible results of i's activity.
Joining a Mate
We assume that two agents who are matched with each other in t may decide to
form a team. Two dierent settings concerning the team production technology
and observability of outcomes are considered.
Model A Each one of the agents operates independently of the other on ex-
actly one project according to (1), and the market can observe two outputs. It
is, however, impossible for outsiders to distinguish which one of the agents has
caused which of the outputs, and projects are attributed with equal probability
to the two team mates.
2
Updating the reputation of each agent then is accom-
plished by taking into account of only the two observed outputs q
a
and q
b
, and
2
One example could be a tailor's shop, where clients leave their clothes for modications
or commission for new ones. Although they are probably attended by someone with expertize
to take their measurements, they typically do not know who will actually execute the job,
and typically it is just one person doing it. Another example could be diamond cutters: it is
impossible to have one doing half of the work on a raw diamond and another one the other
half. Every cutter has his own style, and mixing them up would give an ugly result. Hence,
although we can be quite sure that one, and only one, of the cutters has created the artwork,
we do not necessarily know which one  if they decide to team up in the sense used in this
paper. From a more abstract point of view, there may exist several entities who are able to
do a certain type of task, though only one of them can actually be executing a specic one.
These entities could join each other in a team in order to execute a bunch of identical tasks
and interact via an interface with outside parties, not allowing the latters to learn the internal
distribution of these tasks on individual team-members.
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so p
i
t+1
:= p
i
t+1
(q
a
; q
b
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) for i = 1; 2. This update is given by:
0 (a)
p
i
t
(1 p
j
t
)(1 r)
2
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1
t
(1 p
2
t
)(1 r)
2
+(1 p
1
t
)(1 p
2
t
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t
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2
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2
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2
t
)(1 r)r
(b)
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i
t
p
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t
(1 r)
2
+p
i
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)(1 r)r
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1
t
p
2
t
(1 r)
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1
t
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2
t
)(1 r)r+(1 p
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2
(c)
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2
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1
t
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(1 p
2
t
)r
2
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t
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(1 r)r+(1 p
1
t
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t
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2
(e)
1 (f)
(3)
with j 6= i, where the dierent cases correspond to the observation of the fol-
lowing quantities:
(a) (q
a
= q
b
= 0)
(b) (q
a
= 1; q
b
= 0) or (q
a
= 0; q
b
= 1)
(c) (q
a
= 1; q
b
= 1)
(d) (q
a
= 2; q
b
= 0) or (q
a
= 0; q
b
= 2)
(e) (q
a
= 2; q
b
= 1) or (q
a
= 1; q
b
= 2)
(f) (q
a
= q
b
= 2).
Model B We assume that the market can only observe the aggregate out-
come of the agents' activity, i.e. q := q
a
+ q
b
.
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The Bayesian update p
i
t+1
:=
p
i
t+1
(qjp
i
t
; p
j
t
), i = 1; 2, after observing q then is given by:
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i
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(d)
1 (e)
(4)
with j 6= i, where the dierent cases correspond to (a) (q = 0), (b) (q = 1), (c)
(q = 2), (d) (q = 3), and (e) (q = 4). Clearly, the setting of Model B is less
informative than that of Model A.
In order to isolate the question of whether there are gains from teaming we
suppose, as a rst approach, that the market does not internalize any informa-
tion potentially stemming from the (strategic) decision of the two agents to do
3
One could think, for example, of two scientists who join each other in writing a paper.
The overall quality of the paper may well react positively on each one's contribution, which,
in turn, could be composed of skills and a disturbance term. Nevertheless, one could also
imagine other technologies in this case, like best-shot or weakest-link, for instance.
4
so. We therefore assume that reputations are updated according to (2), on the
one hand, and (3) and (4), respectively, on the other.
4
Additional assumptions must be introduced that specify present and future
payos and how they are related to the agents' reputations. We assume that in
each period there is competition among the principals for the agents, and labour
contracts are based on perceived productivity. This implies that an agent who
stays alone is paid his expected output, which, given his reputation, equals w^
i
t
=
p
i
t
+ r. If two agents team up, then it is the team that receives compensation.
In case that each works on a separate project (Model A), principals are willing
to pay ~w
j
t
= 1=2p
1
t
+1=2p
2
t
+r per project j = 1; 2. ~w
1
t
+ ~w
2
t
is paid if a principal
contracts for the aggregate output of the team (Model B). We have w^
1
t
+ w^
2
t
=
~w
1
t
+ ~w
2
t
, and therefore there are no short-run gains from forming a team. In
fact, in each period, remunerations paid by principals to one-member and two-
member teams are just equal to the team members' aggregated reputations.
Hence, the question arises as to whether two agents might be able to bolster
each others' future reputations by forming a team, or, at least, guarantee that
one's win outweights the loss of the other.
We will assume for the remainder that after t+1 both individuals retire from
their professional activity, and, when deciding whether to team up or not, each
one looks at only his own expected reputation for the last period of activity.
5
The decision to team up or abstain from doing so may well depend on the
agents' types, and therefore, the market could learn from the mere observation of
the agents' decision. Before discussing such an inference in Section IV, however,
we will analyze in the following section in which cases there are gains from trade,
given that the market updates reputations according to observed production
results.
II. Model A: Gains from Trade
None of the agents knows in advance the realizations of the stochastic compo-
nents when deciding whether to join a team or not. These realizations, together
with the agents' types, determine their next-period reputations via (2) and (3),
respectively. In what follows we derive expected reputations for all combinations
of agents' types and for the two modes of operation. For the case of staying
solo, we denote this value by E
X
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
) , where X 2 fG;Bg denotes the type
of the agent (evidently, G (B) means 
i
= 1 (
i
= 0)). In case of a team, we
term it as E
XY
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) for agent i, where i is of type X and his team mate,
j, is of type Y , and X;Y 2 fG;Bg.
4
The calculations that follow are rather bothersome and have been performed using DE-
RIVE 5.0. The worksheet is available on request from the author.
5
In a more dynamic setting, qualitative results may be dierent if two players interact
more than once. Each player then would have to take into account of his inuence on the
reputation of the other because this has an eect on potential gains from trade in subsequent
encounters.
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Two bad types: 
1
= 
2
= 0
We have
E
B
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
) = (1 r)p
i
t+1
(0jp
i
t
)+rp
i
t+1
(1jp
i
t
)
= r
p
i
t
(1 r)
p
i
t
(1 r)+(1 p
i
t
)r
(5)
and
E
BB
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)= (6)
1
2
[
(1 r)
2
p
i
t+1
(0;0jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)+r(1 r)p
i
t+1
(1;0jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)+
(1 r)rp
i
t+1
(0;1jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)+r
2
p
i
t+1
(1;1jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)
]
2
= 2r(1 r)
p
i
t
(1 p
j
t
)(1 r)
2
p
1
t
(1 p
2
t
)(1 r)
2
+(1 p
1
t
)(1 p
2
t
)r(1 r)+(1 p
1
t
)p
2
t
(1 r)
2
+(1 p
1
t
)(1 p
2
t
)r(1 r)
+
r
2
p
i
t
p
j
t
(1 r)
2
+p
i
t
(1 p
j
t
)(1 r)r
p
1
t
p
2
t
(1 r)
2
+p
1
t
(1 p
2
t
)(1 r)r+(1 p
1
t
)p
2
t
r(1 r)+(1 p
1
t
)(1 p
2
t
)r
2
: (7)
The dierence in expected reputation from staying alone and joining a team is

i
:=E
B
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
) E
BB
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)=
p
i
t
(p
j
t
 p
i
t
)r(r 1)
3
[r(2p
i
t
 1) p
i
t
][r(p
1
t
(4p
2
t
 3) 3p
2
t
+2)+p
1
t
(1 2p
2
t
)+p
2
t
]
; (8)
and we have

i
8
>
<
>
:
= 0 for p
i
t
= 0 or p
i
t
= p
j
t
> 0 for p
i
t
2 (0; p
j
t
)
< 0 for p
i
t
2 (p
j
t
; 1):
(9)
Hence, given that side-payments are not feasible, for each of two bad types,
there are strict incentives to join a team i own reputation is strictly higher
than that of the other. This, of course, implies that there cannot exist strict
incentives at the same time for both of them. Therefore, if both look at their
own expected reputation, it is only conceivable to nd a bad-bad-type team if
both have the same reputation or if one has reputation zero  and then both
are just indierent between staying solo and forming a team.
6
On the other hand, if side-payments are feasible, then trade between both
bad types is conceivable if the gain for one outweights the losses of the other
when coming together. Indeed, it follows from (8) that

1
+
2
(
= 0 for p
1
t
= p
2
t
< 0 for p
1
t
6= p
2
t
,
(10)
(see Appendix A for the analytical expression for 
1
+ 
2
) which indicates
that there are strict gains from making up a team if reputations are unequal.
Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration.
6
It might be worth to note why an agent with higher reputation than the other strictly
prefers team work: if he stays alone and nature draws 
i
= 0, then his bad type is revealed.
If he is in a team, then his type is only revealed if 
i
= 
j
= 0, which is less likely. Moreover,
good results are more "blamed" on him than on his low-reputation team mate, and the latter
is held more responsible for bad results.
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Figure 1: Two bad types. Sign of 
1
+
2
. Solid lines represent 0-loci.
Bad type, Good type: 
1
= 0; 
2
= 1
As before, we have
E
B
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
) = (1 r)p
1
t+1
(0jp
1
t
)+rp
1
t+1
(1jp
1
t
)
= r
p
1
t
(1 r)
p
1
t
(1 r)+(1 p
1
t
)r
(11)
for the bad type. For the good type
E
G
(p
2
t+1
jp
2
t
) = (1 r)p
2
t+1
(1jp
2
t
)+rp
2
t+1
(2jp
2
t
)
= (1 r)
p
2
t
(1 r)
p
2
t
(1 r)+(1 p
2
t
)r
+r (12)
holds.
For the bad type, joining the team yields
E
BG
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
;p
2
t
) = (1 r)
2
p
1
t+1
(0;1jp
1
t
;p
2
t
)+(1 r)rp
1
t+1
(0;2jp
1
t
;p
2
t
)+
r(1 r)p
1
t+1
(1;1jp
1
t
;p
2
t
)+r
2
p
1
t+1
(2;1jp
1
t
;p
2
t
): (13)
It follows that
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
1
:= E
B
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1
t+1
jp
1
t
) E
BG
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)
(
= 0 for p
1
t
= 0 or p
2
t
= 1
< 0 for p
1
t
> 0 and p
2
t
< 1.
(14)
Indeed, for p
1
t
> 0 and p
2
t
< 1, the bad type strictly prefers teaming up with a
good type to staying alone: he simply knows that the good guy will guarantee
higher probabilities of moderate and excellent outcomes, and he can free-ride on
this  provided that he is not already known to have productivity zero (p
1
t
= 0)
or the other is known to be of good type (p
2
t
= 1).
Now lets look at the perspective of the good type. His expected reputation
from joining a team is
E
GB
(p
2
t+1
jp
1
t
;p
2
t
) = (1 r)
2
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2
t
) (15)
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Note that for p
1
t
> 0 and p
2
t
< 1 we have E
BG
(p
1
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1
t
; p
2
t
) > r(1   r)p
1
t+1
(1; 1jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) +
r
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(2; 1jp
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)  rp
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t
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Combining (12) and (15) we obtain
8

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:= E
G
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2
t+1
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1
t
) E
GB
(p
2
t+1
jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)
(
= 0 for p
1
t
= 0 or p
2
t
= 1
> 0 for p
1
t
> 0 and p
2
t
< 1.
(16)
In fact, going together with a bad type means to share good reputation for good
and intermediate results obtained from own high productivity and to share bad
reputation for bad results obtained by the other's low productivity.
Now lets look at the questions whether there exist gains from trade. Figure
2 depicts graphically the sign of the generic form of 
1
+
2
, depending on p
1
t
and p
2
t
and for all ranges of r (see Appendix A for the analytical expression for

1
+
2
).
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Figure 2: Bad type (1), good type (2). Sign of 
1
+
2
. Solid lines represent
0-loci. The areas indicated by (+) and (-) do only exist for r 
p
2   1 and
r  2 
p
2, respectively.
Two good types: 
1
= 
2
= 1
For each of the good types i = 1; 2
E
G
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
) = (1 r)p
2
t+1
(1jp
i
t
)+rp
i
t+1
(2jp
i
t
)
= (1 r)
p
i
t
(1 r)
p
i
t
(1 r)+(1 p
i
t
)r
+r; (17)
holds when staying alone.
If both join the same team, then
E
GG
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
;p
j
t
) = (1 r)
2
p
i
t+1
(1;1jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)+(1 r)rp
1
t+1
(1;2jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)+
r(1 r)p
i
t+1
(2;1jp
i
t
;p
j
t
)+r
2
p
i
t+1
(2;2jp
i
t
;p
j
t
); (18)
8
Note that for p
1
t
> 0 and p
2
t
< 1 the sum of the second and fourth term of the rhs of (15)
is lower than r. At the same time, the sum of the rst and third term is lower than or equal
to (1  r)p
2
t+1
(1jp
2
t
).
9
Note that in Figure 2 the two areas designated by (+) and (-), repectively, do not exist
over the whole range of r. The area indicated by (+) in (a) only appears for r 
p
2   1.
With r increasing, this area tends to ll the entire space below the diagonal, making the area
indicated by (-) in (c) disappear for r  2 
p
2.
8
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
It can be shown that

i
:= E
G
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
) E
GG
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
)
8
>
<
>
:
< 0 for p
i
t
> p
j
t
and p
i
t
6= 1
= 0 for p
i
t
= p
j
t
or p
i
t
= 1
> 0 for p
i
t
< p
j
t
and p
i
t
6= 1,
(19)
which indicates that there are strict gains from joining a team i own reputation
is strictly higher than that of the other yet lower than one. This, of course,
implies that there cannot be simultaneous strict gains from making up a team.
Nevertheless, the possibility of side-payments might help realize gains from
trade  if they exist. One obtains, however,

1
+
2
(
= 0 for p
1
t
= p
2
t
> 0 for p
1
t
6= p
2
t
,
(20)
(see Appendix A for the analytical expression for 
1
+
2
) which indicates that
there are strict gains from staying alone if reputations are unequal, and if the
latter are equal there is just indierence. Figure 3 gives a graphical illustration.
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Figure 3: Two good types. Sign of 
1
+
2
. Solid lines represent 0-loci.
III. Model B: Gains from Trade
In what follows we will analyze the case where only the aggregate output can
be used by the market to update reputations. Expected reputations for the
dierent types in case of individual operation can be taken from the preceding
section.
Two bad types: 
1
= 
2
= 0
We have
E
BB
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) = (1  r)
2
0 + r(1  r)p
i
t+1
(1jp
i
t
; p
j
t
)
+(1  r)rp
i
t+1
(1jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) + r
2
p
i
t+1
(2jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) (21)
The explicit expression for the relative advantage from staying alone 
i
:=
E
B
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
)  E
BB
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) is given in Appendix B. Figure 4 (a) illustrates
the sign of 
1
.
9
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Figure 4: Two bad types. (a) Sign of 
1
. Solid lines represent 0-loci. (b) For
r ! 1 the line of interior 0-loci converges towards the upper boundary of the
box.
We can compare this to Model A (see (9)) where each of the two bad types
has strict incentives to join the respective other i own reputation is higher than
that of the latter. For Model B, if reputations of both are not too high, then it
is of advantage to join the other even if that one's reputation is slightly higher
than one's own. On the other hand, if the reputations of both are suciently
high, then staying alone is of advantage even if the other's reputation is slightly
lower than one's own. The reason for this phenomenon is that the observed
outcome is less informative in Model B than in Model A: if a player has relatively
low reputation, then the advantage of teaming up, namely that of enjoying
higher probability to maintain one's bad type unrevealed, prevails, while, if
reputation is rather high, it is the disadvantage of having to share reputation
for intermediate result that has more weight.
Finally, it can be shown that for r ! 1, being in a team becomes advanta-
geous for a player for a set of combinations (p
1
t
; p
2
t
) that converges to the entire
square [0; 1]  [0; 1] (see Figure 4 (b)). It appears that the benets of having
an additional stochastic variable (the other's ), on which one potentially could
free-ride if its realization is equal to one, outweights the losses of having the
other player free-riding on one's own. These losses become smaller with increas-
ing r because a result of q = 1 is more and more attributed to luck rather than
to a good type of the player.
In contrast to Model A there can be simultaneous gains from forming a team
for both players, even without the possibility of side-payments. This is the case
for tupels of reputations (p
1
t
; p
2
t
) belonging to area A of Figue 5 (a), which is
obtained from Figure 4 (a) by combining the 0-loci of 
1
and 
2
. If reputations
are small enough (inferior to r) and not too dierent, then both win from joining
each other in a team.
Looking at the case of transferable utility, Figure 5 (b) depicts the sign of

1
+
2
. Comparing this to Model A (see Figure 1), where there are gains from
forming a team whenever reputations are unequal, one realizes that for high
enough and not too dierent reputations, staying alone is of advantage.
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Figure 5: Two bad types. (a) Signs of 
1
and 
2
(in brackets). Solid lines
represent 0-loci. (b) Sign of 
1
+ 
2
. Bold solid lines represent 0-loci. The
other solid lines stem from (a).
Bad type, Good type: 
1
= 0, 
2
= 1
We have
E
BG
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) = (1  r)
2
p
1
t+1
(1jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) + r(1  r)p
1
t+1
(2jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)
+(1  r)rp
1
t+1
(2jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) + r
2
p
1
t+1
(3jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) (22)
for the bad type, and
E
GB
(p
2
t+1
jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) = (1  r)
2
p
2
t+1
(1jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) + r(1  r)p
2
t+1
(2jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)
+(1  r)rp
2
t+1
(2jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) + r
2
p
2
t+1
(3jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) (23)
for the good type.
It follows that
10

1
:= E
B
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
) E
BG
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)
(
= 0 for p
1
t
= 0
< 0 for p
1
t
> 0.
(24)
Analoguously to Model A, for p
1
t
> 0 the bad type strictly prefers teaming up
with a good type to staying alone, because he knows that the good guy will
guarantee higher probabilities of moderate and excellent outcomes, and he can
free-ride on this  provided that he is not already known to have productivity
zero, p
1
t
= 0. In contrast to Model A, however, there are gains for the bad type
from teaming even if p
2
t
= 1: because only aggregate output is observable, for the
bad type free-riding on a favourable realization of the disturbance corresponding
to the good type's contribution, 
2
, is possible  which does not apply when
the outcome of two separate projects is observed.
Clearly, for the good type there is nothing to win by teaming up because his
high productivity is occulted by additional stochastic inuences  
1
and 
1
(the latter of which being stochastic only from the point of view of the outside
10
Note that for p
1
t
> 0 we have E
BG
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) > r(1 r)p
1
t+1
(2jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)+r
2
p
1
t+1
(3jp
1
t
; p
2
t
) 
rp
1
t+1
(2jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)  rp
1
t+1
(1jp
1
t
) = E
B
(p
1
t+1
jp
1
t
).
11
observer)  and he also cannot benet from the bad type's zero productivity.
Hence,

2
:= E
G
(p
2
t+1
jp
2
t
) E
GB
(p
2
t+1
jp
1
t
; p
2
t
)
(
= 0 for p
2
t
= 1
> 0 for p
2
t
< 1.
(25)
This means that if no side-payments are feasible, both players won't team
up.
On the other hand, if the bad type can compensate a good-type partner,
then it can be shown that 
1
+
2
behaves as illustrated in Figure 6 (a).
11
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Figure 6: Bad type (1), good type (2). (a) Sign of 
1
+
2
. Solid lines represent
0-loci. (b) As r ! 1, the area representing gains from staying alone (+) tends
monotonically to cover the entire quadrant.
Interestingly, the advantage of teaming seems to increase over some range
with the good type's reputation. This is due to the fact that his losses from
joining the bad type decrease at a higher rate than the latter's wins from joining
a good-type partner. Also, as illustrated in Figure 6 (b), as r increases, the
good type enjoys increasingly higher benets from staying alone (boosting his
expected reputation towards one), and this advantage cannot be compensated
by the bad type's opportunity to free-ride on 
2
, that, unfortunately for him, is
increasingly held responsible for contributing to relatively good results.
Two good types: 
1
= 
2
= 1
For both players we have
E
GG
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) = (1  r)
2
p
1
t+1
(2jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) + r(1  r)p
i
t+1
(3jp
i
t
; p
j
t
)
+(1  r)rp
i
t+1
(3jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) + r
2
p
i
t+1
(4jp
i
t
; p
j
t
); (26)
i; j = 1; 2, j 6= i.
In Appendix B one nds an explicit expression for
i
. Figure 7 (a) illustrates
the sign of 
1
.
11
We omit here the analytical expression for 
1
+
2
because of its enourmous unhandiness
and refer the interested reader to the DERIVE 5.0 worksheet available from the author. Note,
that the curve of 0-loci intersects the diagonal at p
1
t
= p
2
t
= r.
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Figure 7: Two good types. (a) Sign of 
1
. Solid lines represent 0-loci. (b) For
r ! 1 the line of interior 0-loci converges towards the diagonal of the box.
We can compare this to Model A (see (19)), where a good type has strict
incentives to join another good type i own reputation is strictly higher than
that of the other. In contrast to this, for a relatively low reputation (lower
than r) of a good-type player, he is willing to join the other good type even if
that one's reputation is slightly higher (but not too high), and for relatively high
reputations (higher than r), staying alone is better even if the other's reputation
is slightly lower (but not too low).
In order to understand this, one must realize that Models A and B, though
not equivalent, are similar, in the sense that Bayesian updating is the same if
the aggregated outputs of Model A, q
a
and q
b
, are equal to q of Model B 
except for q
a
+ q
b
= q = 2. This has important implications. In particular,
looking at the two good types considered here, if 
1
= 
2
= 0 then in Model A
we observe q
a
= q
b
= 1 and in Model B q = 2. Clearly, q = 2 is less informative
to outsiders than q
a
= q
b
= 1 because, unlike the latter, it cannot exclude
neither q
a
= 2; q
b
= 0 nor q
a
= 0; q
b
= 2, i.e. the existence of a good-type player
with good luck and a bad-type player with bad luck. This can be of advantage
for either of the two good types involved, provided that the reputation of the
respective other player is not too high to take all the credit. In fact, it can be
shown that E
(B)
GG
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
)   E
(A)
GG
(p
i
t+1
jp
i
t
; p
j
t
) > (<)0 i p
j
t
< (>)r, for all
0 < p
i
t
< 1. Hence, the dierence between Figure 7 (a) and (19).
We can therefore conclude that, in contrast to what has been found for
Model A, there are gains from teaming for two good types even in case of non-
transferable utility (see Figure 8 (a)). The gains for the case of transferable
utility, 
1
+ 
2
, are depicted in Figure 8 (b) and are represented by a set of
reputations that contains area A from (a).
IV. Informational Content of Reputation Deals
With the results of the preceding section in hands, we are in a position to analyze
what can be learned by an outside observer from the fact that two agents with
observable reputations join each other or abstain from doing so.
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Figure 8: Two good types. (a) Signs of 
1
and 
2
(in brackets). Solid lines
represent 0-loci. (b) Sign of 
1
+ 
2
. Bold solid lines represent 0-loci. The
other solid lines stem from (a).
Model A
Non-Transferable Utility
It is clear, of course, that without the possibility of side-payments there are
never strict incentives for a team to be formed. Hence, nothing can be learned
concerning the types of the agents. As will become clear in the following, the
same conclusion is not warranted in case of possible side-payments.
Transferable Utility
First of all, it must be observed that, if one good type and one bad type are
involved, it cannot in all cases be infered who is who. To see this, one needs
to take into account that Figure 2 represents the joint gains from forming a
team under the assumption that player 1 is bad type and player 2 is good type.
Figure 9 below combines this case with the opposite one.
It is then clear that we cannot distinguish the two players if the aggregate
relative reputation gains 
1
+
2
come from an area where either they form a
team or stay alone, independently of who is good and who is bad. This occurs
in areas A,C,D and F for cases (a) and (c), and in all areas for case (b). Or, to
put it the other way around: only if r 6= 0:5 and reputations (p
1
t
; p
2
t
) are from
the respective areas B or E, we are able to determine who is the good guy 
given that we know that one is good and the other is bad. Table 1 on p. 16
gives a resume of this result.
With this issue being claried, we are now able to extract the information
inherent in observing either a team or two individual agents doing their jobs
for any given tupel of reputations (p
1
t
; p
2
t
). For this purpose, we combine all
the partitions stemming from Figures 1, 3 and 9. This obviously just coincides
with the one of Figure 9, and so the analysis consists of looking at what can be
inferred for the dierent areas given in this gure.
Let's look, for example, at area A for the case that 0 < r <
p
2   1. If we
observe a team, then it is clear that only two bad types, (B,B), can have joined.
Hence, both players' types are instantly revealed: p^
i
t
= 0, i = 1; 2. On the other
14
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Figure 9: Bad type, good type, or vice versa. Sign of 
1
+ 
2
. This Figure
is obtained by mirroring Figure 2 at the diagonal which starts at the origin.
The signs in brackets apply for the case that player 1 is good type and player 2
bad type  the opposite to the case depicted in Figure 2. Solid lines represent
0-loci. For r 
p
2  1 (r  2 
p
2) regions A and F (C and D) are not present
in (a) ((c)).
hand, given that everybody stays alone, one of the other combinations of types
must have occured: (G,G), (B,G) or (G,B). Since two bad types at the same
time can be excluded, both players' updated reputations, after observing their
decision to stay alone, must be higher than the original ones. In fact,
p^
i
t
=
p
i
t
p
j
t
+ p
i
t
(1  p
j
t
)
p
1
t
p
2
t
+ (1  p
1
t
)p
2
t
+ p
1
t
(1  p
2
t
)
> p
i
t
; (27)
i = 1; 2; i 6= j. Hence, if a player is member of a draw dierent to (B,B), then
his reputation is boosted, independently of whether he is actually of good type
or bad type.
Table 2 on p. 16 resumes the result of this analysis for all of the areas A-F
and the whole range of r.
From this table we can gather how the dierent combinations of types are
aected by reputation-updating from observing their decision to form a team or
to stay alone. A (B,B) combination has a dicult life: In areas A and F both
of them are instantly recognized as being of bad type. In areas B and E, one
of them is recognized as bad, while the other stays with his original reputation.
Areas C and D imply a reduction in reputation for both players, although none
of them is degraded to being a bad type with certainty.
A (B,G) combination gives an advantage also to the bad type if the reputa-
tions of both are relatively low and fall in either area A or F. In areas B and E,
however, either the bad type or the good type is revealed, and for areas C and
D, the reputations of both will suer.
Finally, looking at a (G,G) combination, in A and F the reputation of both
players is boosted, however, not to the extent that types are revealed. However,
in B or E, one of them is recognized as the good type. In C and D the good
types of both are revealed.
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0 < r < 0:5 0:5 < r < 1
Area B E B E
Team 1 2 2 1
Alone 2 1 1 2
Table 1: Who is the good guy? Given that there is one bad and one good type,
information revealed in areas B and E of Figure 9 (a) and (c), respectively, from
observing either a team or two agents acting solo. For all of the other areas, no
conclusion can be drawn about who is who.
A Team (B,B) ( 
r
; 
r
)
Alone (G,G), (B,G), (G,B) (+;+)
B Team (B,B),(G,B) (0; 
r
)
(B,B),(B,G) ( 
r
;0)
Alone (G,G),(B,G) (0;+
r
)
(G,G),(G,B) (+
r
;0)
C Team (B,B),(B,G),(G,B) ( ; )
Alone (G,G) (+
r
;+
r
)
D Team (B,B),(B,G),(G,B) ( ; )
Alone (G,G) (+
r
;+
r
)
E Team (B,B),(B,G) ( 
r
; 0)
(B,B),(G,B) (0; 
r
)
Alone (G,G),(G,B) (+
r
; 0)
(G,G),(B,G) (0;+
r
)
F Team (B,B) ( 
r
; 
r
)
Alone (G,G),(G,B),(B,G) (+;+)
Table 2: What can be learned from either observing a team or two individualists?
For all areas those combinations of types are indicated that are consistent with
the observed choice. For areas B and E there is a dierence between the cases
0 < r < 0:5 and 0:5 < r < 1  this is indicated in bold for the latter one.
Note that for r = 0:5 only areas A,C,D and F apply. The last column indicates
whether the updated reputation p^
i
t
is greater (+), equal (0) or lower (-) than p
i
t
.
The superscript
r
indicates when an individual's type is instantly revealed.
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Model B
Non-Transferable Utility
In contrast to Model A, there are gains from teaming even in case of non-
transferable utility. For relatively low reputations (lower than r) of both players,
(B,B) as well as (G,G) combinations tend to team up, whereas (B,G) or (G,B)
never do. We can combine Figures 4 (a) and 8 (a) in order to analyze what
can be learned when observing a team. The situation in the relevant region,
[0; r] [0; r], is illustrated in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Case of non-transferable utility. Combinations of types who agree to
team in the dierent areas. A: (B,B) and (G,G). B,B': (G,G). C,C': (B,B). In
all other regions of the interval [0; 1]  [0; 1] at least one player prefers to stay
alone.
Table 3 on p. 18 describes for all regions of [0; 1] [0; 1] what combinations
of types can be expected when observing a team or individual activity, and it
compares the corresponding conditional probability of a player being of good
type, p^
i
t
, to the ex ante one, p
i
t
.
Clearly, learning a lesson from these observations in some cases accelerates
the revelation of types, in others it holds up the process. For instance, although
reputations are relatively low, a (G,G) combination is instantly identied in
areas B and B'. On the other hand, each of the members of a (B,B) combination
receives a boost in area A, provided that p
1
t
; p
2
t
> 1=2.
Transferable Utility
We can combine Figures 5 (b), 6 (a) and 8 (b) in order to be able to analyse
what can be learned from either observing a team or individual activity. Figure
11 on p. 20 depicts the relevant partition of the unit square, and Table 4 on p.
19 presents the results.
12
Recall that the curves in this gure are given by (42) and (44) of Appendix B. Note that
for 0 < r < 0:5 and 0:5  r < 1 two dierent cases emerge, with areas B and B' disappearing
as r passes the barrier.
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A Team (B,B),(G,G) (+;+) i p
1
t
; p
2
t
> 1=2
(+; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
> 1=2
(0;+) i p
1
t
> 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
( ; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
(0; ) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
( ; ) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
Alone (B,G),(G,B) ( ; ) i p
1
t
; p
2
t
> 1=2
( ; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
> 1=2
(0; ) i p
1
t
> 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
(+; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
(0;+) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
(+;+) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
B, B' Team (G,G) (+
r
;+
r
)
Alone (B,B),(B,G) ( ; )
(G,B)
C, C' Team (B,B) ( 
r
; 
r
)
Alone (B,G),(G,B) (+;+)
(G,G)
[0; 1]  [0; 1] less Team None 
the above sets Alone (B,B),(B,G) (0; 0)
(G,B),(G,G)
Table 3: Non-transferable utility. What can be learned from either observing
a team or two individualists? For all areas those combinations of types are
indicated that are consistent with the observed choice. The last column indicates
whether the updated reputation p^
i
t
is greater (+), equal (0) or lower (-) than p
i
t
.
The superscript
r
indicates when an individual's type is instantly revealed.
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A Team Alone (B,B),(G,G) (+;+) i p
1
t
; p
2
t
> 1=2
E (+; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
> 1=2
(0;+) i p
1
t
> 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
( ; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
(0; ) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
( ; ) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
Alone Team (B,G),(G,B) ( ; ) i p
1
t
; p
2
t
> 1=2
( ; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
> 1=2
(0; ) i p
1
t
> 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
(+; 0) i p
1
t
= 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
(0;+) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
= 1=2
(+;+) i p
1
t
< 1=2; p
2
t
< 1=2
B Team (B,B) ( 
r
; 
r
)
Alone (B,G),(G,B) (+;+)
(G,G)
C Team (B,B),(G,B) (0; 
r
)
Alone (B,G),(G,G) (0;+
r
)
C' Team (B,B),(B,G) ( 
r
; 0)
Alone (G,B),(G,G) (+
r
; 0)
D Team (B,B),(B,G) ( 
r
; 
r
)
(G,B)
Alone (G,G) (+
r
;+
r
)
Table 4: Transferable utility. What can be learned from either observing a team
or two individualists? For all areas those combinations of types are indicated
that are consistent with the observed choice. The last column indicates whether
the updated reputation p^
i
t
is greater (+), equal (0) or lower (-) than p
i
t
. The
superscript
r
indicates when an individual's type is instantly revealed.
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Figure 11: Transferable utility. Relevant partition of the unit square.
V. A Signaling-Theory of Team-Formation
In the setting of the previous section, the issue of learning raises the problem
of strategic behaviour by the agents: if, for example, for a certain combination
of reputations it is known that only good types could possibly win joining each
other in a team, and if compensation were based on learning this fact, then also
the other combinations of types would team up. Therefore, it is impossible to
learn if agents expect us to do so  at least if we learn in this naive manner.
This point, however, is based on the assumption maintained so far that teaming
bears no cost. In the following we will admit costs for forming teams and develop
a simple model in the tradition of signaling-theory that captures the possibility
for information being (partly) revealed in a consistent way.
We assume
c(B;B) > c(G;B) = c(B;G) > c(G;G)  0; (28)
i.e. making up a team is most costly for the (B,B) combination and least costly
for the (G,G) combination, with costs for ((G,B),(B,G)) lying in the middle.
A possible interpretation could be that more capable individuals do not only
exhibit higher performance concerning their productive activity, but do also
easier in organizing their professional partnerships.
In what follows we do not model negotiation between the two agents, rather
we assume that they team up i there is a surplus from doing so.
13
Clearly, it
seems unreasonable to assume that the process of negotiation could be observed
publicly, and that potentially lessons could already be learned by interpreting its
course and result. We therefore abstract from the internal interaction between
the two agents and assume the existence of two players: a) the union of the two
potential teammates, on the one hand, and b) the market, on the other.
We are then in a signaling framework in the tradition of Spence (1973), and
in what follows we will work out the perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies
(see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a,b), Gibbons (1992)) that may exist.
13
Note that it does not make any dierence whether we consider the production technology
of Model A or B, because in both cases the value of aggregated output is the same for any
combination of types.
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No teams at all
This cases is associated with
2  c(G;G) < 0: (29)
This means that for a (G,G) combination, teaming up never pays o, even if it
is believed that only (G,G)'s join each other. Obviously, because of (28), also
neither of the other combinations of types would then form a team. Therefore,
only pooling equilibria in which all stay solo do exist.
Only (G,G) potentially team up
This case is associated with
2  c(G;G)  0
2  c(G;B) < 0:
Clearly, neither of the combinations (B,B),(G,B),(B,G) would ever form a team.
Hence, for a pooling equilibrium, beliefs out-of-equilibrium at the information
set where a team is observed must attribute probability 1 to the (G,G) combi-
nation. Then an equilibrium where no combination teams up exists if
2  c(G;G)  p
1
t
+ p
2
t
: (30)
On the other hand, (G,G) separate from the other combinations by forming a
team if
2  c(G;G)  p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
; (31)
where
p^
i
t
:=
p
i
t
(1  p
j
t
)
p
1
t
(1  p
2
t
) + (1  p
1
t
)p
2
t
+ (1  p
1
t
)(1  p
2
t
)
; i = 1; 2; j 6= i; (32)
represents the probability of player i being a G-type, given that (B,B),(G,B)
and (B,G) join each other in not teaming up. Figure 12 below illustrates the
occurrence of both types of equilibria, depending on 2  c(G;G).
-
p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
p
1
t
+ p
2
t
2  c(G;G)
0
no
teams
no
teams
(G,G)
team
(G,G)
team
2
Figure 12: Occurrence of pooling and separating equilibria.
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Only (G,G),((G,B) and (B,G)) potentially team up
This case is associated with
2  c(G;G) > 0
2  c(G;B)  0
2  c(B;B) < 0:
In this case, beliefs out-of-equilibrium at the information set where a team is
observed must attribute probability 0 to the (B,B) combination. In the following
we consider only symmetric equilibria in the sense that the (G,B) and the (B,G)
combination behave the same way.
For a pooling equilibrium, suppose that beliefs out-of-equilibrium are that
the (G,G) combination occurs with probability  and ((G,B),(B,G)) with prob-
ability 1  . Then
1 +   c(G;G)  p
1
t
+ p
2
t
(33)
impedes (G,G),((G,B),(B,G)) to deviate. Hence, pooling with no teams ob-
served exists if (33) holds for some   0.
On the other hand, only (G,G) team up, if
2  c(G;G)  p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
(34)
2  c(G;B)  p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
; (35)
with p^
i
t
as in (32). Finally, having (G,G),((G,B),(B,G)) teamed up requires
~p
1
t
  c(G;G)  0 (36)
~p
1
t
  c(G;B)  0; (37)
with
~p
i
t
:=
p
i
t
p
j
t
+ p
i
t
(1  p
j
t
)
p
1
t
p
2
t
+ p
1
t
(1  p
2
t
) + (1  p
1
t
)p
2
t
; i = 1; 2; i 6= j: (38)
Figure 13 below illustrates the occurrence of all possible types of equilibria,
depending on c(G;G) and c(G;B).
In analogy to the previous case, equilibria of type (i) and (ii) can coexist when
c(G;G) and c(G;B) both lie between A and D. In case (a),
14
an equilibrium of
type (iii) cannot coexist with type (ii) because c(G;B) 2 [0;D] and c(G;B) 2
[B;C] are incompatible. Hence, (iii) is only compatible with (i) for c(G;G) 2
[A;B] and c(G;B) 2 [B;C]. In case (b), (ii) and (iii) simultaneously exist for
c(G;B) 2 [B;D] and c(G;G) 2 [0; B].
It is possible to exclude some of the pooling equilibria (i) using the intuitive
criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)): if 2 c(G;B) < p
1
t
+p
2
t
then the ((G,B),(B,G))
combinations cannot possibly improve over their equilibrium payo by deviating
to "team", while, if 2   c(G;G) > p
1
t
+ p
2
t
, the (G,G) combination could if it
is believed that only (G,G) deviates. Hence, for c(G;G) < 2   (p
1
t
+ p
2
t
) <
c(G;B), those pooling equilibria with c(G;G) to the right of A and to the left
of 2  (p
1
t
+p
2
t
) (which in turn lies to the left of B, but is not given in the gure)
can be excluded.
14
Note that ~p
1
t
+ ~p
2
t
 2  (p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
) i p
1
t
+ p
2
t
 1.
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-~p
1
t
+ ~p
2
t
1  (p
1
t
+ p
2
t
)
0
2  (p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
)
2
-
~p
1
t
+ ~p
2
t
1  (p
1
t
+ p
2
t
)
0
2  (p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
)
2
(a)
(b)
c(G;G); c(G;B)
c(G;G); c(G;B)
A B C
A B C
D
D
(i) c(G;G) 2 [A;C]: no team
(ii) c(G;B) 2 [0;D]: (G,G) and ((G,B),(B,G)) team
(iii) c(G;G) 2 [0; B] and c(G;B) 2 [B;C]: (G,G) team
Figure 13: Occurrence of the three types of equilibria.
All potentially team up
This case is associated with
2  c(G;G) > 0
2  c(G;B) > 0
2  c(B;B)  0:
First lets look at pooling equilibria where everybody stays solo. Suppose that
beliefs out-of-equilibrium are that the (G,G) combination occurs with probabil-
ity , ((G,B),(B,G)) with probability , and with 1      , (B,B) shows up.
Then no combination joins a team if
2+    c(G;G)  p
1
t
+ p
2
t
(39)
Hence, pooling on "solo" always exists, with  and  choosen such that +  1
and (39) satised.
An equilibrium with only (G,G) teaming up exists if (34) and (35), together
with 2   c(B;B) < p^
1
t
+ p^
2
t
hold (whereby the latter condition is implied by
(35)).
(G,G) and ((G,B),(B,G)) team up if (36) and (37) hold, and in addition
~p
1
t
+ ~p
2
t
  c(B;B)  0.
A new type of equilibrium is now conceivable: all combinations make up
teams. Suppose that beliefs out-of-equilibrium, i.e. after observing "solo" are
that the (G,G) combination occurs with probability , ((G,B),(B,G)) with prob-
ability , and (B,B) with probability 1    . Then no combination deviates
from "team" i
p
1
t
+ p
2
t
  c(B;B)  2+  (40)
Hence, p
1
t
+p
2
t
 c(B;B)  0 is necessary and sucient for this type of equilibrium
to exist, and choosing  and  such that +  1 and such that (40) is satised
describes the set of all of them.
In terms of Figure 13, the following types of equilibria do exist:
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(i) c(G;G) 2 [0; C]: no team
(ii) c(G;B) 2 [0;D] and c(B;B) 2 [D;C]: (G,G) and ((G,B),(B,G)) team
(iii) c(G;G) 2 [0; B] and c(G;B) 2 [B;C]: (G,G) team
(iv) c(B;B)  p
1
t
+ p
2
t
: all combinations team up.
As before, it is possible to eliminate some of the pooling equilibria (i) by
applying the intuitive criterion: if c(G;G) < 2 (p
1
t
+p
2
t
) < c(G;B), only (G,G)
could possibly benet from a deviation, and therefore beliefs should attribute
probability  = 1 to this combination of types. Furthermore, if c(G;G) <
c(G;B) < 2  (p
1
t
+ p
2
t
) < c(B;B) then (B,B) should have probability zero, i.e.
+  = 1. Concerning the pooling equilibra of type (iv), the intuitive criterion
does not impose restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, since for none of the
combinations of types the maximal possible payo (of 2) from choosing not to
team up is equilibrium-dominated.
Conclusion
This paper has complemented the traditional theory of teams by introducing en-
dogenous team-formation by agents who are informed about the types of their
potential teammates. In a framework where the market pays compensation
according to perceived productivity and updates reputations after observing
outputs, from an individual agent's point of view, the decision to team up is
driven by the tradeos between free-riding on the high productivity of the po-
tential teammate  if possible  the opportunity to conceal own type  if
necessary  and the advantage of joining a low-reputation partner. Teaming
has been identied as benecial for some combinations of types with certain
reputations. Most notably, high-productivity individuals may be willing to join
low-productivity ones, although it means a reputation-loss and requires com-
pensation via side-payments. Such a behaviour might be dierent in a context
where reputation as such counts more than its equivalent in money, though.
It would also be interesting to analyze reputation deals in a longer-term con-
text where agents interact more than once and, therefore, would have to take
into account of the indirect eects of the decision to team on their own future
reputations.
For the purpose of modeling information-revelation in a fully rational way,
a full-edged signaling model of team formation has been presented that as-
sumes teaming-costs that are inversely related to aggregated ability of the team.
Clearly, the teaming mechanism partially reveals information under some con-
ditions, although it cannot be completely revealing due to instrument insu-
ciency. Nevertheless, in case that one considers moral hazard as an additional
problem, this nding emphasizes the importance of direct incentives provided by
(team-)compensation that is conditioned on the actual performance of a team
(Holmstrom (1982a)). It would be interesting to look at this latter issue in a
combined model, probably also considering other production technologies.
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Appendix A
Gains from trade for Model A for all combinations of types, depending on initial
reputations, p
1
t
and p
2
t
, and r.
Two bad types
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Appendix B
Relative gains from staying alone for Model B for all combinations of types,
depending on initial reputations, p
1
t
and p
2
t
, and r.
Two bad types

i
= fp
i
t
r(1 r)(p
i
t
2
(2p
j
t
2
r
2
(2r 1)+p
j
t
(2r
4
 19r
3
+20r
2
 8r+1)
+r(7r
2
 7r+2)) p
i
t
(p
j
t
2
(6r
4
 11r
3
+16r
2
 8r+1)
 p
j
t
r
2
(7r
2
+2r 1)+r
2
(4r
2
+r 1))
+r(p
j
t
2
(3r
3
 5r
2
+6r 2) p
j
t
r(4r
2
 r+1)
+2r
3
))g=f((p
i
t
(2r 1) r)(p
i
t
(2p
j
t
(2r 1) 3r+1)
+p
j
t
(1 3r)+2r)(p
i
t
(p
j
t
(6r
2
 6r+1)
 r(3r 2)) r(p
j
t
(3r 2) r)))g; (41)
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where the interior 0-loci of 
i
are given by the following function:
p
j
t
(p
i
t
;r) = f(p
i
t
4
(4r
6
 68r
5
+189r
4
 178r
3
+75r
2
 14r+1)+2p
i
t
3
r(14r
5
+15r
4
 130r
3
+118r
2
 39r+4) p
i
t
2
r
2
(63r
4
 94r
3
 91r
2
+86r 18)+2p
i
t
r
3
(20r
3
 39r
2
 3r+4)
 r
4
(8r
2
 16r 1))(1 r) p
i
t
2
(2r
4
 19r
3
+20r
2
 8r+1)
 r
2
(p
i
t
(7r
2
+2r 1) 4r
2
+r 1))g
1=2
=f(2(2p
i
t
2
r
2
(2r 1)
 p
i
t
(6r
4
 11r
3
+16r
2
 8r+1)+r(3r
3
 5r
2
+6r 2)))g; (42)
i; j = 1; 2, j 6= i. This function intersects once with the diagonal of the space
(p
i
t
; p
j
t
) at p
i
t
= r. Furthermore, the corner solutions for 
i
= 0 are p
i
t
= 0 and
p
i
t
= p
j
t
= 1.
Bad type, Good type
Due to complexity not given.
Two good types

i
= r(1 r)(p
i
t
 1)(p
i
t
2
(2p
j
t
2
(r
2
 2r+1)(2r 1)+p
j
t
r(2r
3
+3r
2
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 r
2
(2r
2
 1)) p
i
t
r(p
j
t
2
(2r 1)(3r
2
 r 1) p
j
t
r(r
2
 2r+1)
 r
3
)+p
j
t
r
3
(p
j
t
(3r 2) r))=((p
i
t
(2r 1) r)(p
i
t
(2p
j
t
(2r
 1) r) p
j
t
r)(p
i
t
(p
j
t
(6r
2
 6r+1) r(3r 2)) r(p
j
t
(3r 2) r))) (43)
where the interior 0-loci of 
i
are given by the following function:
p
j
t
(p
i
t
;r) =  r((p
i
t
4
(4r
6
+44r
5
 91r
4
+22r
3
+55r
2
 42r+9)
 2p
i
t
3
r(22r
5
 11r
4
 27r
3
+16r
2
+5r 3)+p
i
t
2
r
2
(45r
4
 46r
3
+6r+1)
 2p
i
t
r
4
(7r
2
 6r+1)+r
6
)+p
i
t
2
(2r
3
+3r
2
 5r+1)+p
i
t
r(r
2
 2r+1) r
3
)
1=2
=(2(2p
i
t
2
(2r
3
 5r
2
+4r 1) p
i
t
r(6r
3
 5r
2
 r+1)+r
3
(3r 2))) (44)
i = 1; 2, j 6= i. This function intersects once with the diagonal of the space
(p
i
t
; p
j
t
) at p
i
t
= r. Furthermore, the corner solutions for 
i
= 0 are p
i
t
= 1 and
p
i
t
= p
j
t
= 0.
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